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Suppose we observe an infinite series of coin flips X1, X2, . . ., and wish to sequentially test the null
that these binary random variables are exchangeable. Nonnegative supermartingales (NSMs) are a
workhorse of sequential inference, but we prove that they are powerless for this problem. First, utilizing
a geometric concept called fork-convexity (a sequential analog of convexity), we show that any process
that is an NSM under two distributions, is also necessarily an NSM under their “fork-convex hull”.
Second, we demonstrate that the fork-convex hull of the exchangeable null consists of all possible laws
over binary sequences; this implies that any NSM under exchangeability is necessarily nonincreasing,
hence always yields a powerless test for any alternative. Since testing arbitrary deviations from
exchangeability is information theoretically impossible, we focus on Markovian alternatives. We
combine ideas from universal inference and the method of mixtures to derive a “safe e-process”, which
is a nonnegative process with expectation at most one under the null at any stopping time, and is
upper bounded by a martingale, but is not itself an NSM. This in turn yields a level α sequential
test that is consistent; regret bounds from universal coding also demonstrate rate-optimal power.
We present ways to extend these results to any finite alphabet and to Markovian alternatives of any
order using a “double mixture” approach. We provide a wide array of simulations, and give general
approaches based on betting for unstructured or ill-specified alternatives. Finally, inspired by Shafer,
Vovk, and Ville, we provide game-theoretic interpretations of our e-processes and pathwise results.
Keywords: Anytime-valid sequential inference; betting; calibrator; composite Snell envelope; de Finetti mixing;
fork-convexity; game-theoretic probability; Jeffreys’ prior; method of mixtures; nonnegative supermartingale;
optional stopping; regret bound; safe e-process; universal coding; Ville’s theorem.
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1 Testing exchangeability
Suppose we observe a sequence of binary coin flips X1, X2, . . . one at a time. Consider the fundamental
problem of testing if our data (Xt)t≥1 is an exchangeable sequence:
H0 : X1, X2, . . . are exchangeable.
For the unfamiliar reader, (Xt)t≥1 is exchangeable if and only if for every t and every permutation σ of
the first t indices, (X1, . . . , Xt) has the same distribution as (Xσ(1), . . . , Xσ(t)). If we find enough evidence
against the null, we would like to stop collecting data and reject the null as soon as possible. Let Q
represent the set of all exchangeable distributions over infinite binary sequences. Then, we can rephrase
the null as H0 : the data are generated from some Q ∈ Q.
Let (Ft)t≥0 represent the canonical filtration of the data, where F0 is the trivial sigma algebra and
Ft = σ(X1, . . . , Xt). All martingale statements in this paper will implicitly refer to this canonical filtration.
A level α sequential test for Q (that is, for H0) is any stopping time τα such that
sup
Q∈Q
Q(τα <∞) ≤ α, (1)
meaning that with probability 1− α, we never stop under the null. In this paper, we will design powerful
sequential tests for exchangeability, and prove their consistency, and in some cases rate-optimality, against
Markovian alternatives.
Despite nonnegative supermartingales (NSMs) being a central object in sequential testing [12, 13], the
nontriviality of our contribution stems from the following: Theorem 17 proves that every NSM under
exchangeability must be a nonincreasing process and thus powerless. The way out is to look beyond NSMs,
at an object called a safe e-process, which we introduce next. Safe e-processes are intimately related to
NSMs — all NSMs are safe e-processes, and all admissible safe e-processes are infima of NSMs [22] — but
the two concepts are different, and our paper seeks to explore this gap in detail and exploit it successfully.
1.1 Safe e-processes and anytime-valid p-processes





EQ[Eτ ] ≤ 1, (2)
where the second supremum is over all stopping times τ , possibly infinite. Above, we interpret E∞ :=
lim supt→∞Et to accommodate potentially infinite stopping times. (As mentioned earlier, the filtration
(Ft) defined previously is fixed and implicit.) Howard et al. [12] do not use the term e-process, but
introduce study exponential processes that are upper bounded by composite nonnegative supermartingales,
which is a characterizing property of e-processes. Related notions have been studied by Shafer et al.
[31], Grünwald et al. [10], Ramdas et al. [22], Vovk and Wang [36], amongst others.
Remark 1 (on terminology). An ‘e-variable’ is a nonnegative random variable that has expectation
at most one under the null [36]; in other words Et is an e-variable for every t, while we call (Et) as
an e-process due to the additional property (2) that insists that stopped e-processes are also e-variables,
meaning that Eτ is an e-variable for any stopping time τ . The value realized by an e-variable will be
called an e-value. While recent works in this rapidly evolving area have sometimes blurred the distinctions
between e-processes, e-variables and e-values, we believe that our choices of terminology may be more
suitable to emphasize sequential problem setups involving stopping times.
Large e-values encode evidence against the null, and it is easy to check that the stopping time
κα := inf
{






results in a level α sequential test by applying Markov’s inequality to the stopped e-process. More details
can be found in [22], who also show that the sequence (pt) defined by pt := infs≤t 1/Es is an anytime-valid





Q(pτ ≤ α) ≤ α, for all α ∈ [0, 1]. (4)
Here the second supremum is taken over all stopping times τ . Following the above remark, a p-variable is
a random variable whose distribution is stochastically larger than uniform under the null. Thus, a stopped
p-process is a p-variable, and we call its realization as a p-value (a number between 0 and 1).
Since such Q-safe e-processes yield both sequential tests and anytime-valid p-processes, we focus on
constructing e-processes for the rest of this paper. As a matter of convention, we always use κα to denote
the above stopping time, that is the one that thresholds a safe e-process at level 1/α, while τ denotes a
generic stopping time.
Power one and consistency. We call an e-process powerful if the corresponding test is powerful, and
of course we desire a test that is consistent, meaning that its power goes to one with the sample size.
Formally, a level α sequential test τα has asymptotically power one against some family P ⊃ Q if
inf
P∈P\Q
P(τα <∞) = 1.
(Henceforth, if we mention some alternative P, it is understood that we desire power against P\Q.)
A Q-safe e-process (Et) is said to be consistent, or power one, if its associated sequential test κα
from (3) is asymptotically power one at any level, meaning that
for all α ∈ (0, 1), inf
P∈P\Q




Et =∞, P-almost surely, for every P ∈ P\Q. (5b)
1.2 Convex hulls and de Finetti’s theorem
Let the null set Q consist of all product distributions Ber(p)∞ for some p ∈ [0, 1]. Note that Q is a rich
composite class of parametric distributions, whose convex hull is Q, which is a result well known as de
Finetti’s theorem [17].
Any sequential test for Q is also valid for Q, a fact that we record below, proved in [22].
Proposition 2. The properties of type-1 error control (1) and safety are closed under the convex hull,
meaning that any Q-safe e-process is also Q-safe, and any level α sequential test for Q is also valid for Q.
As a consequence, we may restrict our attention to developing a Q-safe e-process, and invoke the above
fact to step from the i.i.d. setting to the exchangeable setting. This will be our approach in the rest of
this paper. Another consequence is that testing the null Q against the alternative Q is futile; safe and
consistent e-processes do not exist and neither do valid, power-one tests.
Remark 3. To avoid confusion, we note that the convex combination of Q, Q′ ∈ Q must be carefully
interpreted. For example, if Q = Ber(0.3)∞ and Q′ = Ber(0.7)∞ then a draw from (Q + Q′)/2 produces
either a sequence with 70% zeros or a sequence with with 70% ones, each with probability half, while it
produces a sequence with equal number of zeros and ones with probability zero. Contrast this with the fact
that a draw from ((Ber(0.3) + Ber(0.7))/2)∞ is equally likely to produce a zero or a one at every point in
time, and thus produces a sequence with equal zeros and ones with probability one. Thus, one must take
care to differentiate between ((Ber(0.3) + Ber(0.7))/2)∞, which is not in the convex hull of Q and Q′, and
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Figure 1: Various classes of distributions over infinite binary sequences encountered in this paper. See
Proposition 4 and Theorem 17 for the proof of the displayed set inclusions.
It is impossible to have a powerful test for Q against its complement Qc, since the alternative is too
rich and consists of too many distributions that are too close to Q, meaning that there are too many ways
to violate exchangeability. For example, it should be apparent to the reader that if the first coin has bias p1
and every other coin has bias p 6= p1, then the resulting sequence is not exchangeable but we would never
be able to reliably detect this deviation. This example relies on ensuring that the information required
to detect a deviation from the null is exhausted early on in the sequence. To avoid such pathologies
it is necessary to restrict the alternative class in some meaningful way. Markovian alternatives are an
attractive choice, balancing the needs of relevant practical motivation, tractable mathematical structure,
succinct probabilistic description, and intuitive aesthetic appeal.
1.3 Time-homogeneous Markovian alternatives
We focus on the setting of first-order Markov alternatives P1, and return to address higher-order (and
even more general) alternatives later. To describe P1 more formally, each P ∈ P1 represents a time-
homogeneous first-order Markov process with parameters p1|0 and p1|1. Here we abbreviate p0|0 = 1− p1|0
and p0|1 = 1− p1|1. For arbitrary k ∈ N, we will also consider Pk, the set of k-th order Markov processes.
Let C represent the distributions that result in constant sequences (Xt), i.e., where X1 = X2 = . . ..
These include, of course, the distributions of deterministic sequences 0∞ and 1∞. The class C also includes
their mixtures, which are distributions that first set X1 ∼ Ber(p) for some p and then set Xt = X1 for all
t > 1. In other words, conditional on X1, the remaining observations are i.i.d. Xt ∼ Ber(X1).
Proposition 4. For any {0, 1}-valued stochastic process (Xt), the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) (Xt) is k-th order Markov (with respect to its natural filtration) for some k ∈ N and exchangeable.
(ii) (Xt) is either constant (as a function of time) or i.i.d.
Said differently, Q∩ Pk = Q∪ C for any k ∈ N.
This relation and more are illustrated in Figure 1. The proof and some additional remarks can be
found in Appendix B.
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1.4 Wald’s sequential likelihood (or probability) ratio test
Let the likelihood under a particular Q ∈ Q, where Q = Ber(p)∞, be represented by
Qt ≡ Qp(X1, . . . , Xt) := (1− p)n0pn1 ,
where n0 = n0(t) and n1 = n1(t) represent the number of zeros and ones seen up to time t. The likelihood
associated to P ∈ P1, say, for simplicity with P(X1 = 1) = 1/2, is given by

















Here n1|0 ≡ n1|0(t) denotes the total number of ones following zeros up to time t, etc. (We omit the
dependence on t to ease notational load.)
For a point null Q ∈ Q and point alternative P ∈ P1 with P 6= Q, Wald’s sequential likelihood (or
probability) ratio test (SLRT or SPRT) [39] yields a power-one test. The likelihood ratio process, i.e.,
(Pt/Qt), is a Q-martingale starting at one and thus a Q-safe e-process, and the resulting sequential test
inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt/Qt ≥ 1/α} is a level α test under Q that is known — up to a discrete-time issue called
“boundary overshoot” — to have the smallest expected stopping time under P [41].
For composite nulls and alternatives, the SLRT cannot be directly applied. The mixture SLRT
integrates over the alternatives using a “prior” distribution (or, more appropriately, mixture distribution,
to avoid any Bayesian interpretations of our frequentist statements). However, this only works for
composite alternatives, since mixing over the null set does not yield a safe e-process or the desired type-1
error control property in (1). (We note here that, interestingly, the GROW e-variables of [10] are ratios
of mixtures, though they are safe only for a fixed sample size.) The generalized SLRT maximizes the
likelihood under both null and alternative, but this also does not yield a martingale or a safe e-process. In
both cases, it is difficult to find a threshold for the resulting process that achieves type-1 error control
in (1), since the SLRT’s choice of 1/α does not suffice. For a discussion of techniques and results for this
approach we refer to [16].
1.5 Nonnegative supermartingales (NSMs) and an impossibility result
Despite the above apparent difficulties in generalizing the SLRT to yield an e-process, it has been recently
established that nonnegative (super)martingales play a fundamental role in the design of admissible
sequential tests (and the construction of admissible safe e-processes), even for composite nonparametric
nulls [12, 22]. In anticipation of the results to follow, it is useful to set up some relevant notation. In what
follows, a process (Mt)t≥0 will be called a Q-NM if it is a nonnegative martingale with initial value one,
that is, (Mt) is adapted to (Ft), M0 = 1 and EQ[Mt|Fs] = Ms ≥ 0 for any s ≤ t. Such processes are called
test martingales by Shafer et al. [31]. If (Mt) is a Q-NM simultaneously for every Q ∈ Q, then we will call
it a Q-NM. If the equality above is replaced by an inequality ≤, then we will call it a Q-NSM or Q-NSM
(nonnegative supermartingale).
An appropriate variant of the optional stopping theorem [7] implies that for any Q-NSM (Mt) and any





EQ[Mτ ] ≤ 1,
where the second supremum is over all stopping times τ , potentially infinite [22, Section 3]. Indeed,
for any Q-NSM, M∞ := limt→∞Mt is a well defined random variable, and supQ∈Q EQ[M∞] ≤ 1. The
correspondence with the definition of a safe e-process (recall (2)) is not coincidental — to construct a
Q-safe e-process, it suffices to construct a Q-NSM. However, we claim the following.
Proposition 5. Every Q-NSM is also a P1-NSM (recall that Q and P1 contain all i.i.d. and first-order
Markov distributions respectively). In fact, every Q-NSM is also a Pk-NSM for every k ∈ N, and is also a
P-NSM for any set P. In other words, any Q-safe e-process with nontrivial power cannot be a Q-NSM,
since the latter is powerless against any alternative P by virtue of being a P-NSM.
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This proposition will follow from Theorem 17. This paper is as much about understanding the above
negative result, as about providing a positive result. In other words, this result probes at the “gap”
between a Q-safe e-process and a Q-NSM. The former is a much weaker property than the latter. While
the latter suffices for the former, it is by no means necessary, as recently observed in a more abstract
setup [22]. Indeed, a Q-NSM (Nt) satisfies the much stronger “conditional” property that
EQ[Nτ |Fs] ≤ Nτ∧s for every Q ∈ Q and stopping time τ ,
which implies the earlier mentioned optional stopping result. In fact, the above property is satisfied if and
only if (Nt) is a Q-NSM, but the e-process property (2) can be satisfied even by processes that are upper
bounded by Q-NSMs for each Q ∈ Q, but are not themselves Q-NSMs. It is exactly this gap that we will
exploit going forward.
We provide a geometrical characterization of the above phenomenon: essentially, we will show that the
above proposition is true because Pk lies within the “fork-convex hull” of Q, and we prove that this hull
preserves the NSM property of a process. In fact, Theorem 17 proves that the fork-convex hull of Q is
all-encompassing, containing every law over binary sequences. Thus, a Q-NSM yields a powerless test
against Pk since it is automatically and unintentionally safe under the alternative as well as under the
null. Along the way, we will encounter other friends from martingale theory, such as the Snell envelope,
which previously has not played a prominent role in the mathematical treatment of sequential testing.
1.6 A powerful Q-safe e-process that is not a Q-NSM




where (MQt ) is a Q-NM. As mentioned before, each limiting variableMQ∞ is well defined and has expectation
at most one, and thus, E∞ := lim supt→∞Et also has expectation at most one. The safety property
immediately holds at infinite times as well, meaning that supQ∈Q EQ[E∞] ≤ 1 and supQ∈Q supτ EQ[Eτ ] ≤ 1,
where the second supremum is over all stopping times τ . To avoid too much suspense before we get into
these subtle new concepts, we first present our solution immediately, and delay its derivation to the next






































where Γ denotes the usual gamma function.
Theorem 6. The process (Rt) is a Q-safe e-process, and thus thresholding it at level 1/α yields a level α
sequential test κα for exchangeability.
The first three subsections of Section 2 is devoted to the justification of the above theorem (its proof
is implicit in its derivation). Later, Theorem 7 proves that this test has power one for first-order Markov
alternatives, i.e., (5a) holds, and quantifies the rate of growth. Above, (Rt) is not itself a Q-NSM, but
is nevertheless upper bounded by a (different!) Q-NM for every Q ∈ Q, resulting in it being a Q-safe
e-process. This idea is enabled by bringing together the method of mixtures (using Jeffreys’ prior) for
combining the composite alternative, with the maximum likelihood under the composite null. Beyond
showing that it has power one, one can quantify that it has rate-optimal power by utilizing a regret bound
from universal coding. The next section, among others, proves the above theorem, after which we turn
to defining fork-convexity. Then we provide some numerical simulations and conclude with a discussion
about this paper’s approach compared to other possible approaches to the problem.
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1.7 A summary of this paper’s contributions
This paper proposes a nontrivial and powerful test for exchangeability, a fundamental and easy-to-state
problem that exposes rich geometric and probabilistic structure. The most directly related work is that of
Vovk [35], who proposed a very different approach based on conformal prediction, discussed in Section 5.3.
The problem of testing exchangeability also serves as a test-bed to carefully examine the gap between
processes that are composite NSMs, and processes that are composite safe e-processes. The former is a
special case of the latter and the latter is a necessary ingredient for the former [22], but the difference
between these concepts has remained somewhat implicit in past work [12]. This work constitutes the first
detailed investigation of a problem where nontrivial NSMs do not exist (Proposition 5, Theorem 17) but
powerful safe e-processes do exist (Theorem 6, Theorem 7).
In the process, we prove many results that are of independent interest. For example, the NSM property
is closed under “fork-convex combinations” of distributions (Lemma 12, Theorem 13). We prove that a
composite safe e-process can be improved upon by a composite NSM only if the set of distributions is
fork-convex, and this improvement is given by a composite Snell envelope (Theorem 14, Corollary 16).
Section 4 examines the empirical behavior of our safe e-process in a simulation suite that includes
both basic sanity checks and rather subtle and nontrivial alternatives. Finally, Section 5.4 suggests a way
to interpret our e-process in the language of game-theoretic protocols of Shafer and Vovk [30].
2 Jeffreys’ mixture meets maximum likelihood
As briefly mentioned earlier, if the null set was a singleton, say corresponding to Ber(p)∞, and the
alternative was also a singleton, such as when (Xt) deterministically alternates between 0 and 1, then
Wald’s sequential likelihood ratio test [39] would immediately yield a solution to the problem at hand. To
elaborate, let fp denote the probability mass function of a Ber(p) random variable and let L01 denote the
likelihood function under the alternative:
L01(X1, . . . , Xt) :=
{
1 if (X1, X2, . . . ) = (0, 1, 0, 1, . . . );
0 otherwise.
Then, for any point null (indexed by p) define the following likelihood ratio:
Rpt :=







0 with Ber(p)∞-probability 1− pbt/2c(1− p)dt/2e.
It is easy to check that (Rpt ) is a Ber(p)∞-NM, and thus a Ber(p)∞-safe e-process, and κα from (3) yields
a valid level α sequential test that coincides with Wald’s original proposal [39]. The question is how to
generalize this approach to deal with a composite null and a composite alternative in a computationally
tractable and statistically powerful manner.
The following observation deals the first blow: the only process that is a nonnegative martingale under
every i.i.d. Bernoulli sequence is one that is constant. In other words, the only Q-NM is such that Mt = 1
for all t ∈ N0. This obviously results in a powerless test. So we then turn our attention to constructing a
Q-NSM, or a test supermartingale. Unfortunately this approach is dealt a fatal blow by Proposition 5. As
alluded to in the introduction, we cannot employ mixtures in both numerator and denominator because
it violates safety by lowering the denominator too much, and we cannot maximize the likelihood in the
numerator and denominator because it violates safety by raising the numerator too much.
Our proposal combines a suitably chosen mixture in the numerator with maximum likelihood in the
denominator, thus avoiding both pitfalls.
2.1 Dealing with the composite null via maximum likelihood
To start, let us return to the point alternative described above (alternating 0 and 1), and just handle the






likelihood under the point alternative
maximum likelihood under the null
is a Q-safe e-value. Indeed, suppose the data truly comes from Ber(p∗)∞ for an unknown p∗. Then, it is
obvious that RMLt ≤ R
p∗
t , where the latter process is a Ber(p∗)∞-NM. Thus, for any Q ∈ Q (corresponding
to some p∗ ∈ [0, 1]) and any stopping time τ , we have
EQ[R
ML
τ ] ≤ EQ[Rp
∗
τ ] ≤ 1,
where the last step invokes the optional stopping theorem for the Ber(p∗)∞-NM (Rp
∗
t ).
To see that the resulting test has good power, note that under the alternative, p = 1/2 uniquely
achieves the above infimum at any even time t ∈ 2N, in which case the denominator equals (1/2)t and the
numerator equals one. Thus, RMLt = 2t at even times, and the test inf{t ≥ 0 : RMLt ≥ 1/α} is a valid level
α sequential test that stops either at time dln(1/α)/ ln(2)e or at time dln(1/α)/ ln(2)e+ 1.
To recap, despite the fact that we cannot find a Q-NM, (RMLt ) is a powerful Q-safe e-process against
the considered point alternative. This test takes the ratio of the likelihood under the alternative to the
maximum likelihood under the null. Next, we detail how to handle the composite alternative P when
testing a point null in Q.
2.2 Dealing with the composite alternative using a Jeffreys’ mixture
A standard way of dealing with composite alternatives is to “mix” over them by choosing an appropriate
mixture distribution. This is sometimes called the Laplace method, pseudo-maximization, or Robbins’
method of mixtures [25, 23, 27, 24, 26]. It was first utilized successfully primarily in parametric settings,
but has recently re-emerged as a powerful tool for nonparametric inference [5, 13, 16, 43]. This mixture
is sometimes called a “prior”, but it must be made clear that this is not a prior in the Bayesian sense —
any other distribution also suffices to serve as a mixture in terms of maintaining safety, and no extra
assumption is made on the true data when such a “working prior” is employed. The choice of mixture
does not affect safety, but it does affect computability and power. In the following, we work with a very
particular choice of mixture because it yields closed-form expressions, and it yields small constants in
regret bounds from the universal coding literature (which has implications for power).
Taking independent Jeffreys’ priors (with densities w(θ) := 1/(π
√
θ(1− θ))) for p1|0 and p1|1, we
obtain the mixture likelihood
Pw×w(X1, . . . , Xt) :=
∫































Γ(n0|0 + n1|0 + 1)Γ(n0|1 + n1|1 + 1)
.
Here we have taken the mixture over all first-order Markov distributions Pp1|0,p1|1 , under which {X1 = 1}
has probability 1/2.
Thus, for any point null represented by Ber(p)∞, we can define the mixture likelihood ratio
RJP,pt :=
Pw×w(X1, . . . , Xt)∏t
s=1 fp(Xs)
=
Jeffreys’ mixture over the alternative
likelihood under the point null
. (7)
Using Fubini’s theorem to swap integrals, it is easy to check that RJP,pt is a Ber(p)∞-NM, and the
corresponding sequential test is Wald’s usual mixture SLRT [40]. Note that it is the very particular form
of this mixture that yields a closed form expression and thus a computationally feasible test. However, we
do not use this mixture just for computational reasons; as we detail soon, combining it with the earlier
maximum likelihood idea also yields a statistically near-optimal power.
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2.3 Combining Jeffreys’ mixture with maximum likelihood
Using, as in the previous example, that the likelihood under the null is maximised at p = n1/t, where it
evaluates to (n1/t)
n1 (n0/t)
n0 , we find that
Rt :=
Jeffreys’ mixture over the alternative
maximum likelihood under the null
reduces to the expression in (6). This is a Q-safe e-value by combining the arguments used for the safety
of (RJP,pt ) and (RMLt ): swapping the maximum likelihood with the (unknown) true likelihood, and then
employing Fubini’s theorem.
We remark that any prior above would have yielded a Q-safe e-value, and in fact any Beta prior would
have yielded one in closed form, but the Jeffreys’ mixture above allows us to invoke an appropriate optimal



















)n0 × e− 12 ln(n1|0+n0|0)− 12 ln(n1|1+n0|1)−O(1)
=
maximum likelihood of Markov model
maximum likelihood of Bernoulli model
× e− ln t−O(1). (8)
That is, (Rt) starts gathering evidence against the null if the maximum likelihood for the first-order
Markov chain outperforms the maximum likelihood for the Bernoulli model by a factor of order t. Note
that this is a small hurdle to overcome, as the first term is growing exponentially fast in t when the data
are explained better by a Markov model, as argued next.
2.4 A pathwise theorem on the power of (Rt)
Although our main focus is on first-order Markov alternatives, (Rt) actually has power under much more



























The theorem that follows is a “pathwise” result, holding for any sequence where the above limits exist
and satisfy an additional weak condition, described later. These limits exist, for example, under any k-th
order Markov alternative (but may be random unless suitable irreducibility properties hold). Note that
the equality of the two expressions for γ follows from the fact that n1|0 and n0|1 can differ by at most one.
Similarly, n1 differs from n1|1 + n0|1 by at most one, which explains why the two expressions for p are
equal. Moreover, note that one has the relations


















Here we use the convention 0/0 := 1. In the first-order Markov case these parameters are simply the
transition probabilities.
Within the class of first-order Markov chains, the special case of i.i.d. Bernoulli data is characterized
by the restriction p1|1 = p1|0 (and hence p0|1 = p0|0), or equivalently
α(1− p) = γp (10)
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(and hence γ(1− p) = βp). For more general models, such as higher-order Markov chains, the restriction
α(1− p) = γp no longer characterizes the i.i.d. Bernoulli case. This is illustrated in Example 9, where it
is also shown that (Rt) can be powerless against such alternatives (that is, under higher-order Markov
alternatives that appear to be Bernoulli when summarized by only first order transition parameters).
Nonetheless, as explained in Remark 8 below, in the suitably ergodic non-Bernoulli k-th order Markov
case one still has α(1− p) 6= γp generically, and therefore achieves power against such alternatives thanks
to the following theorem.





































− p ln p− (1− p) ln(1− p). (11)
Note that the second expression is a difference in entropies between first-order Markovian and Bernoulli
sources with the corresponding parameters. Furthermore, if α(1− p) 6= γp we have r∗ > 0, that is, (Rt)
increases to infinity exponentially fast. In fact, r∗ = 0 if and only if α(1− p) = γp. Finally, whenever the
exchangeability null is true, limt→∞Rt = 0 almost surely, in addition to (Rt) being Q-safe.
Note that whenever the null is true, we necessarily have r∗ = 0. However, r∗ = 0 does not by itself
characterize power or consistency; it only characterizes when (Rt) grows exponentially. It is possible
to construct certain “borderline” examples where r∗ = 0, but (Rt) still increases to infinity (our test is
powerful and consistent), albeit at a subexponential rate. We describe and explore such an example in the
numerical simulations in Section 4.3.
In the case of a non-Bernoulli first-order Markov alternative, the condition of the theorem is satisfied
for almost every realization of the data (that is, with probability one), provided the chain does not have
any absorbing states. Indeed, with no absorbing states the Markov chain is recurrent and hence the
ergodic theorem applies. This condition is necessary for a power one test, because if (say) 1 is an absorbing
state then there is positive probability of seeing only ones (unless, of course, the Markov chain starts at 0
with probability one). This is indistinguishable from a realization of an i.i.d. Ber(1) sequence.
Remark 8. Any k-th order Markov chain is characterized by its transition probabilities p1|s ∈ [0, 1] where
s ranges over all prefixes of length k. Note that this determines p0|s = 1 − p1|s, which we thus do not
count as separate parameters. The quantities α, β, γ, p defined previously, when they are deterministic,
are real analytic functions of the transition probabilities. This implies that the condition α(1− p) 6= γp
of Theorem 7 holds “generically” (in the topological sense, i.e., for an open dense set of parameters).
Indeed, a real analytic function is either identically zero, or nonzero on an open dense set, and we know
that α(1− p) = γp does not hold identically (i.e., for all choices of parameters p1|s). This confirms that
α(1− p) 6= γp must hold generically.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let `(t) denote the logarithm of the ratio between the maximum likelihood for the



















































− p ln p− (1− p) ln(1− p),
which is precisely (11). Since `(t)− ln t+O(1) ≤ lnRt ≤ `(t) by (8) we deduce that t−1 lnRt converges



































If α(1− p) = γp then one easily verifies that r∗ = 0. Next, suppose α(1− p) 6= γp. Since α+ γ = p,






























where the inequality is strict because (1 − p)/γ 6= p/α. By the same token, the second parenthesized
expression in (12) is strictly positive as well. In particular, r∗ > 0. Finally, if the exchangeability null is
true, (Rt) converges to zero almost surely because it is dominated by the likelihood ratio corresponding to
two singular distributions on the sequence space.
Example 9. Here we construct a non-exchangeable 2nd-order Markov chain (Xt) where the above test
does not have power one, i.e., (Rt) does not converge to infinity, but instead to zero. This chain satisfies
p = 1/2 and α = γ, hence does not yield a counterexample to Theorem 7 but illustrates the importance of
the condition α(1− p) 6= γp. To this end, set p1|(0,0) = p1|(0,1) = 1 and p1|(1,0) = p1|(1,1) = 0. To visualize
this 2nd-order Markov chain, note that it alternates between two consecutive zeros and two consecutive








By Stirling’s approximation of factorials, Rt tends to zero as t tends to infinity.
The above example motivates the following extension, which we only address briefly as a proof-of-
concept since the details are conceptually straightforward but tedious.
2.5 Extension to higher-order Markovian alternatives and context trees
The aforementioned discussion derived a safe e-process and sequential test for exchangeability of a binary
sequence, in particular targeting first-order Markovian alternatives. Neither the binary observations nor
the first-order alternatives were particularly critical; these were adopted for clarity of exposition and
simplicity of formulae.
Extensions to Markov sources of order k > 1 or alphabet sizes d > 2 are immediate. We may treat
each k-th order context x ∈ {1, . . . , d}k as an independent d-ary prediction problem, and by mixing with
independent Jeffreys’ (which are Dirichlet(1/2, . . . , 1/2)) priors (or equivalently, composing independent
Krichevsky-Trofimov estimators), we obtain a computationally attractive e-process with regret bounded
by (dk(d − 1)/2) ln t + O(1). In other words, we get a closed-form e-process Rk,dt — whose details are
tedious, despite being explicit, and thus omitted — such that
Rk,dt ≥
maximum likelihood of order k Markov model









The (near)-optimality of this approach is discussed by Takeuchi et al. [33]. The e-process (Rt) from (6)
can be interpreted as (R1,2t ).
Further computationally attractive extensions include alternatives that consist of Markov sources of
varying orders k = 1, 2, . . . (see the discussion on the mixture method for unions below). The even more
general Context Tree models have the length of the context that should be taken into account depend on
that very context [45].
A similar calculation to the k = 1, d = 2 case done previously shows that Rk,dt →∞, P–almost surely
for any alternative P ∈ Pk\Q, where Pk is the set of Markovian distributions with order at most k. These
developments lead naturally to the following subsection.
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2.6 Double-mixtures for a countable sequence of alternatives
Let P1,P2,P3 . . . be a countable sequence of alternatives, that may or may not be nested. Suppose for
every k ∈ N one can design a safe e-process (Ekt ) for testing Q against Pk such that it has power one,
meaning that for any P ∈ Pk\Q, we have
lim sup
t→∞
Ekt =∞, P–almost surely.
Then, one can design a safe e-process for Q against
⋃
k∈N Pk such that for any P ∈
⋃
k∈N Pk\Q, we have
lim sup
t→∞
Et =∞, P–almost surely.







which is a countable mixture over the base e-processes (that might have been already mixed using
Jeffreys’ prior). It is straightforward to check that (Et) is a safe e-process under Q, by invoking monotone
convergence and linearity of expectation. To analyze its power, once an alternative P has been picked, let
Pk∗ be the first element of the nested sequence that contains P. Since lim supt→∞Ek
∗
t = ∞, P–almost
surely, the same property holds for (Ek
∗
t /k
∗2), and thus transfers to (Et) since e-processes are nonnegative.








At the (finite) time k∗, Ẽt begins to include to required term Ek
∗
t , and thus inherits its property of




k=1 for any increasing
function f that grows to infinity, possibly with sublinear growth (such as ln(·)), can further save computation
without losing the consistency property.
2.7 Handling generic alternatives via non-anticipating likelihoods and betting
If the alternative to exchangeability is not clearly specified, then a different approach to the one above
may be more suitable, as inspired by the recent work on universal inference by Wasserman et al. [42]. It
involves a non-anticipating likelihood in the numerator, combined with an MLE in the denominator:
RNAt :=
non-anticipating likelihood under the alternative
maximum likelihood under the null
.




where gs is any “non-anticipating” probability mass function, meaning that it is specified before seeing
Xs, but can be learnt using the first s− 1 data points; in other words, (gt) is predictable with respect to
(Ft). One example would be to choose gs as the (smoothed) maximum likelihood estimator under the
alternative using the first s− 1 samples, but other approaches inspired by machine learning or time series
modeling may also be employed. Note that any Bayesian mixture (including ours with Jeffreys’ prior) is
of this non-anticipating form, with gs being the associated predictive distribution.
It is easy to prove that (RNAt ) is a Q-safe e-process: each term can be verified to have conditional mean
at most one by swapping the denominator for the (unknown) true null likelihood. The major strength
of the above approach is that arbitrarily flexible nonparametric or model-free update rules can be used
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without sacrificing validity, thus opening up the potential for power against loosely specified alternatives
or even the discovery of temporal patterns from the observed data. For example, one may employ a
complex Bayesian working model that outputs the posterior predictive probability of observing a zero
or one at the next step, and this would not violate any of our theoretical guarantees regardless of the
choice of priors or working model. Despite such a strong validity guarantee, the current drawback of this
approach is that for generic update rules, there may not be an existing regret bound that we may use to
convince ourselves of its power. (Of course, such regret bounds would be available for specific update
rules and specific alternatives, and the online learning literature is rapidly expanding the scope and types
of available regret bounds for individual sequence prediction.)
As a final remark, this non-anticipating likelihood is closely related to the “predictable-mixture”
approach recently explored by [43], and has its roots in Wald [40, Eq. 10:10]. In this vein, it is also closely
related to testing hypotheses by betting, as popularized by Shafer and Vovk [28, 30]; specifically (gt) can
be viewed as a sequence of bets on the following outcome.
3 Fork-convexity and Q-Snell envelopes
Forgetting for a moment some of the earlier claims made without proof, one of the main questions we seek
to answer in this section is:
When is a Q-safe e-value simply a Q-NM or Q-NSM in disguise? In other words, is any Q-safe
e-value always improved (or recovered) by some Q-NM or Q-NSM?
Such a question was also asked in the latest preprint on safe testing by Grünwald et al. [10]. The necessity
and sufficiency results of Ramdas et al. [22] imply that the answer in the singleton Q = {Q} case is: always
(via the Doob decomposition of the Snell envelope). The answer in the composite setting is: sometimes.
We now qualify the ‘sometimes’ by delving into the rich probabilistic structure underlying safe e-values,
examining its relationship to convex null sets, a concept called ‘fork-convexity’, and a process that we call
a ‘composite’ Snell envelope, known from the mathematical theory of risk measures [6].
Most of this section does not depend on our observations being binary, and we allow the data (Xt) to
take values in a more general space X . Some of the technical notions required below, such as local absolute
continuity, likelihood ratio (or density) processes, and essential suprema, are reviewed in Appendix A.
3.1 A sequential analog of convexity
We first review the concept of fork-convexity, which can be viewed as a sequential version of convexity.
Definition 10. Fix a reference measure R on the sequence space XN.
1. A fork-convex combination of two locally dominated laws Q, Q′ with likelihood ratio processes (Zt), (Z ′t)
is another law Q′′ with likelihood ratio process
Z ′′t :=
Zt, t ≤ shZt + (1− h)Zs Z ′t
Z ′s
, t > s
(13)
for some s ∈ N0 and some Fs-measurable random variable h in [0, 1] with h = 1 on {Z ′s = 0}. The
latter condition ensures that (Z ′′t ) is well-defined and an R-martingale, as required for a likelihood
ratio process.
2. A set Q of probability measures is called fork-convex if every fork-convex combination of elements
of Q still belongs to Q.
Fork-convexity was first introduced by Žitković [38]. It is closely related to a concept in the literature on
risk measures called m-stability, due to Delbaen [6]. A similar notion called rectangularity was introduced
by Epstein and Schneider [8] to describe intertemporal preferences with multiple priors. Rectangularity
14
has then been used extensively in the operations research literature in connection with robust Markov
decision processes; see e.g. [14, 44, 32].
Note that fork-convexity implies convexity. To see this, observe that any (usual) convex combination
aQ+(1−a)Q′ is also a fork-convex combination; just take s = 0 and h = a in (13) to get Z ′′t = aZt+(1−a)Z ′t,
which is the likelihood ratio process of Q′′ := aQ + (1− a)Q′.
A set {Q} that consists of a single law is clearly fork-convex. A set {Q1, Q2} consisting of two distinct
laws will not be fork-convex; it is not even convex. However, one can form its “fork-convex hull”. Here is
the general definition.
Definition 11 (The fork-convex hull and its closure).
1. The intersection of all fork-convex sets that contain a given set Q0 is called the fork-convex hull of
Q0. (Note that there is at least one fork-convex set containing Q0, namely the set of all laws.)
2. The closed fork-convex hull of Q is the closure of the fork-convex hull of Q with respect to L1(R)
convergence of the likelihood ratio processes at each fixed time t ∈ N, where we recall R is the assumed
reference measure.
Just as for usual convex hulls, the fork-convex hull of Q0 consists of all finite fork-convex combinations
of elements in Q0. Here a finite fork-convex combination of some distributions Q1, . . . , Qn ∈ Q0 is a
distribution obtained by iteratively performing (13) a finite number of times on Q1, . . . , Qn, on their
fork-convex combinations, on their fork-convex combinations, and so on. Closed fork-convex hulls play an
important role in Theorem 13 below.
To provide some intuition for the definitions as applied to the null Q considered in this paper, one
can imagine a more “algorithmic” process of producing distributions in the closed fork-convex hull. First
pick any p1 ∈ [0, 1] and observe X1 ∼ Ber(p1). Then, after observing X1, pick any p2, and observe
X2 ∼ Ber(p2). Continue this process indefinitely. Then, the sequence (pt) is (Ft)-predictable and the
resulting binary sequence has a law that is contained in the closed fork-convex hull of Q.
It may be instructive to consider another simple example. For a fixed µ ∈ [0, 1], define Qµ as the set
of product distributions Q over infinite [0, 1]-valued sequences (Xt) such that EQ[Xt|Ft−1] = EQ[Xt] = µ,
and define Q̃µ as the set of distributions Q (not necessarily of product form) over infinite [0, 1]-valued
sequences (Xt) such that EQ[Xt|Ft−1] = µ. Then Qµ is not fork-convex if µ ∈ (0, 1) but Q̃ is, and the
latter is the closed fork-convex hull of the former. The problem of sequentially estimating µ in this setup
has been recently studied by Waudby-Smith and Ramdas [43].
3.2 No power against fork-convex hulls
Consider a null set Q locally dominated by a reference measure R. We now establish the interesting fact
that e-processes based on Q-NSMs are powerless against any alternative in the closed fork-convex hull of
Q. We state this formally in Theorem 13 below, but the underlying reason is contained in the following
lemma.
Lemma 12. If (Lt) is a supermartingale under two laws Q, Q′, then (Lt) is also a supermartingale under
every fork-convex combination Q′′ of Q and Q′.
Proof. Note that Q, Q′ are dominated by R := (Q + Q′)/2. Fix any s ∈ N0 and Fs-measurable random
variable h in [0, 1], and let Q′′ be the fork-convex combination of Q, Q′ given in (13). In compliance with
the definition, we restrict h to satisfy h = 1 on {Z ′s = 0}. Suppose (Lt) is a supermartingale under Q and
Q′. Equivalently, (ZtLt) and (Z ′tLt) are supermartingales under R. Thus for t ∈ {1, . . . , s} we have
ER[Z
′′
t Lt | Ft−1] = ER[ZtLt | Ft−1] ≤ Zt−1Lt−1 = Z ′′t−1Lt−1.
For t ≥ s+ 1 we have
ER[Z
′′





∣∣∣∣Ft−1] ≤ Z ′′t−1Lt−1.
Thus (Z ′′t Lt) is an R-supermartingale, or equivalently, (Lt) is a Q′′-supermartingale.
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The following theorem refers to the closed fork-convex hull of Q. Recall that this is the closure of the
fork-convex hull of Q, understood in the sense of L1(R) convergence of the likelihood ratio processes at
each fixed time t ∈ N.
Theorem 13. Let Q̃ be the closed fork-convex hull of Q. Then every Q-NSM is in fact a Q̃-NSM. Thus
a test based on a Q-NSM is powerless against Q̃ \ Q.
Proof. The fork-convex hull of Q consists of all finite fork-convex combinations of elements of Q. Therefore,
thanks to Lemma 12, every Q-NSM remains an NSM under every law Q in the fork-convex hull of Q. To
extend this to the closure, pick any element Q ∈ Q̃. Then there is a sequence (Qn) in the fork-convex
hull of Q such that Qn → Q. This means that Znt → Zt in L1(R) for all t ∈ N, where (Znt ) and (Zt) are
the likelihood ratio processes of Qn and Q, respectively. By passing to a subsequence, we may assume
that Znt → Zt, R-almost surely, for all t ∈ N. Let (Lt) be any Q-NSM and hence a Qn-NSM for all n.
Equivalently, (Znt Lt) is an R-NSM for all n. By the R-supermartingale property and the conditional version
of Fatou’s lemma, we get









t Lt | Ft−1] ≤ lim inf
n→∞
Znt−1Lt−1 = Zt−1Lt−1.
This completes the proof that every Q-NSM is in fact a Q̃-NSM.
The first part of the above theorem asserts that the NSM property is preserved under taking closed
fork-convex hulls, but note that this is not true for safe e-values in general. Indeed, (Et) being Q-safe
implies that it is conv(Q)-safe, but not necessarily Q̃-safe.
3.3 Composite Snell envelopes
For a single law Q ∈ Q and an e-process (Et), the Q-Snell envelope is the smallest Q-NSM that dominates
(Et). It is natural to ask whether, in contrast to this pointwise construction, one can directly construct a
“composite Q-Snell envelope”, i.e., a smallest Q-NSM that dominates (Et).
It turns out that the ability to define such a Q-Snell envelope of an e-process depends heavily on the
property of fork-convexity. The following result states that if the null set Q is locally dominated and
fork-convex, then a Q-Snell envelope of a given e-process (Et) exists, is safe, and improves upon (Et).
Theorem 14. Let Q be locally dominated and fork-convex. Let (Et) be a Q-safe e-process. Then the
process
Lt := ess sup
Q∈Q, τ≥t
EQ[Eτ | Ft], t ∈ N0,
where τ ranges over all finite stopping times, is the smallest Q-NSM that dominates (Et) and satisfies
L0 ≤ 1. Hence, (Lt) is the Q-Snell envelope of (Et). In particular, by the optional stopping theorem, (Lt)
is a Q-safe e-process.
In this theorem, Lt is defined as the essential supremum of the family of random variables EQ[Eτ | Ft]
indexed by τ and Q. This means that Lt is the smallest random variable that almost surely dominates
this family. The details of this definition are reviewed in Appendix A, along with some key properties. In
particular, the proof of the theorem in Appendix B will make use of Proposition 20.
Remark 15. We caution the reader that ‘essential supremum’ is used outside of this work with a different
meaning: the essential supremum of a (single) random variable X is defined as the smallest constant c
such that X ≤ c almost surely. This notion is different from the one used here, and does not arise in this
paper.
The process (Lt) above is what we call the Q-Snell envelope. Note that the Q-Snell envelope of (Lt) is
almost surely equal to (Lt) itself. In short, the above theorem claims that if Q is fork-convex, then the
Q-Snell envelope of any Q-safe e-process exists and is safe.
To construct a powerful and valid test that dominates a safe e-process (Et), one might be inherently
interested in the largest Q-NSM (Lt) that dominates (Et) and satisfies L0 ≤ 1. However, we are not aware
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of a systematic way to obtain such a process. Nevertheless, even the smallest Q-NSM that dominates
(Et), namely the Q-Snell envelope, still tends to improve its power.
For a given Q, can there be more than one process that is considered a Q-Snell envelope (of some
other process), and amongst these, is there a largest one? In general, the answer is yes for the first
question and (typically) no for the second. Every Q-NSM is its own Snell envelope and there always
exist uncountably many Q-NSMs, namely the constant and nonnegative decreasing processes starting
at one. In particular, the constant process is also a Q-NM albeit a powerless one. In fact, there may be
uncountably many Q-NSMs, with none of these processes dominating the others, and at the same time
there may not exist any non-constant Q-NMs (that don’t use independent external randomization, which
involves expanding the filtration). For this paper’s choice of Q, we later show that every Q-NSM is almost
surely nonincreasing, and hence the constant process equaling one dominates all Q-NSMs, and indeed the
only Q-NM almost surely equals one.
Taken together, Theorems 13 and 14 lead to the following corollary, which tells us that in certain
situations one has to move beyond composite NSMs to achieve powerful tests. We continue to let Q be
any locally dominated null set and Q̃ its closed fork-convex hull.
Corollary 16. Let (Et) be a Q-safe e-process. Then (Et) is dominated by (or equals) some Q-NSM (Lt)
with L0 ≤ 1 if and only if (Et) already happens to be Q̃-safe (and therefore powerless against Q̃ \ Q).
Proof. To prove the forward implication, assume (Et) is dominated by some Q-NSM (Lt) with L0 ≤ 1.
By Theorem 13, (Lt) is in fact a Q̃-NSM. It follows that (Et) is Q̃-safe as claimed, because we have
EP[Eτ ] ≤ EP[Lτ ] ≤ L0 ≤ 1 for every P ∈ Q̃ and each finite stopping time τ .
To prove the reverse implication, assume that (Et) is actually Q̃-safe. An application of Theorem 14
(with Q replaced by Q̃) then gives a Q̃-NSM (Lt) with L0 ≤ 1 that dominates (Et). This completes the
proof of the corollary.
The above result suggests that we must look beyond NSMs for designing sequential tests for exchange-
ability, and we next show that this fact holds regardless of the class of alternatives considered.
3.4 The inadequacy of NSMs for testing exchangeability
We now return to the main focus of this paper, which is binary sequences; thus X = {0, 1}. In this case,
any law P is locally dominated by the i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) law R := Ber(1/2)∞ and the likelihood ratio





Di, where Di := qi(X1, . . . , Xi−1)1{Xi=1} + (1− qi(X1, . . . , Xi−1))1{Xi=0} (14)
for some functions qt : {0, 1}t−1 → [0, 1] such that, R-almost surely,
qt(X1, . . . , Xt−1) = Q(Xt = 1 | X1, . . . , Xt−1).
In particular, taking qt = p ∈ (0, 1) for all t gives the likelihood ratio process of Ber(p)∞ with respect to
R. The following theorem shows that any likelihood ratio process of the form (14) can be approximated
by a finite fork-convex combination of likelihood ratio processes corresponding to i.i.d. Bernoulli laws.
The closed fork-convex hull of this set is therefore very large: it contains all laws over binary sequences.
Theorem 17. Every law P over the space of binary sequences belongs to the closed fork-convex hull of
Q = {Ber(p)∞ : p ∈ (0, 1)}. Thus, the process (Mt) with Mt = 1 for all t is the only Q-NM, and every
Q-NSM must be nonincreasing, and hence these never exceed one and always have zero power for any
α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary law P and let (Zt) be its likelihood ratio process as in (14). We will show by
induction that for each s ∈ N0 there exists an element Q(s) in the fork-convex hull of Q whose likelihood
ratio process (Z(s)t ) satisfies Z
(s)

























Figure 2: A summary of some of the implications related to Q-NSMs and Q-safety (recall Figure 1 for the
definitions of the classes Q, Q, P1, Pk, and Q̃). We would like to design a Q-safe e-process that is powerful
against Pk. Theorem 17 proves that a Q-NSM is non-viable since it unintentionally results in Pk-safety
and thus no power against Pk. The single non-implication sign above opens a door to constructing a
non-NSM based Q-safe e-process that is consistent against Pk. An example for such an e-process is
precisely the construction in (6).
ratio process is equal to one at time zero. Suppose it is true for some particular s. Consider a law Q′
whose likelihood ratio process (Z ′t) satisfies Z ′s+1/Z ′s = 2Ds+1, where Ds+1 is defined in (14). We can
choose Q′ from the fork-convex hull of Q by mixing the 2s Bernoulli laws Ber(qs+1(yk))∞ with weights
1{yk}(X1, . . . , Xs) at time s, where y1, . . . , y2s lists all binary strings of length s. Taking the fork-convex
combination of Q(s) and Q′ at time s with h = 0 gives a law Q(s+1) in the fork-convex hull of Q whose
likelihood ratio process satisfies Z(s+1)t = Z
(s)




s Ds+1 = Zs+1 for
t = s+ 1. Thus Q(s+1) satisfies the induction assumption with s+ 1 instead of s.
Thus, by induction, for each s ∈ N0 there exists an element Q(s) in the fork-convex hull of Q whose
likelihood ratio process (Z(s)t ) satisfies Z
(s)
t = Zt for all t ≤ s, as required. Now, it is clear that for each
fixed t ∈ N, Z(s)t → Zt in L1(R) as s→∞. This shows that P belongs to the closed fork-convex hull of Q
as claimed in the first part of the theorem.
It remains to prove that every Q-NSM (Lt) must be nonincreasing, which implies in particular that
the only Q-NM is the constant process equal to one. Fix any binary sequence ω0 and let P be the law
such that P({ω0}) = 1. By the first part of the theorem, P belongs to the closed fork-convex hull of Q
and hence, by Theorem 13, (Lt) is a P-NSM. Thus Lt(ω0) = EP[Lt] ≤ EP[Lt−1] = Lt−1(ω0) for every t ∈ N.
Since ω0 was arbitrary, this shows that (Lt) must be nonincreasing.
In other words, not only are Q-NSMs inadequate against Markovian alternatives, they are incapable
of detecting any deviation from exchangeability. We include an overview of the relations we have shown
in Figure 2.
4 Numerical simulations and some extensions
Recall that it is impossible to detect all deviations from exchangeability. For example, if only the first bit
of the data is a Ber(0.1) and the rest is Ber(0.2), there is simply not enough information available to reject
the null. The informal reason is that the deviation from the null is temporary and fleeting, not sustained,
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and thus easily ascribed to chance. Motivated by this, the primary focus of the paper has been to detect
Markovian alternatives. In this section, we will examine the power of our approach against three types of
alternatives: (a) the one it was designed primarily for — a first- (and low-) order Markov alternative, (b)
a time-inhomogeneous Markov alternative, and (c) a completely different type of alternative that we were
not intending to have power against: a change point alternative.
Remark 18. The last setting should especially not be confused with change point detection, which has
different goals, such as minimizing ‘detection delay’ (informally, expected difference between the stopping
time and the changepoint, when the procedure stops after the changepoint) subject to a prespecified lower
bound on the ‘average run length’ (expected stopping time when there is no changepoint). To be clearer,
in order for change point detection algorithms to have a small detection delay, they must pay the price
of stopping under the ‘null’ as well, and one typically studies the tradeoffs between those two metrics.
However, we will remain still in the realm of sequential testing, where we do not wish to ever stop if the
null is true, and the metrics of Type I error and power are rather different from the above. Below, we will
focus on measuring evidence using e-processes, where we wish to maximize wealth (or its rate of growth)
under the alternative, subject to an upper bound on expected wealth under the null.
We also reinterpret our test in terms of sequential estimation via confidence sequences in Section 4.6,
and Section 4.7 demonstrates the use of calibrators to construct an e-process that approximately tracks
the maximum wealth thus far.
4.1 Sanity check 1: no power against an i.i.d. Bernoulli sequence
We start with a sanity check, namely that our evidence measure does not report any evidence against
Bernoulli sources (which are exchangeable). Theorem 7 predicts that when the null is true, (Rt) should
decay to zero almost surely, meaning that (lnRt) decays to minus infinity. Further, Jensen’s inequality
implies that at any stopping time τ , lnRτ has nonpositive expectation; hence supQ∈Q supτ EQ[lnRτ ] ≤ 0,
where the second supremum is over all stopping times τ . Figure 3 illustrates that indeed the evidence decays
from the start, as expected. The lower bound from (8) predicts that lnRt could decay logarithmically in
time (but not faster), meaning that lnRt & − ln t, and that seems particularly tight in the figure below.
(a) Bernoulli(0.5) (b) Bernoulli(0.2)
Figure 3: The blue line shows the evolution of lnRt under two Bernoulli sources. The green line is the
lower bound − ln(t) following from (8). The decay is consistent with Theorem 7, which predicts that
lnRt → −∞ almost surely.
Having established that the predictions under the null are accurate, we now estimate the power against
Markovian alternatives. We first consider a fixed Markov alternative, which the test targets. Then we
consider a time-varying Markov alternative, which the test does not explicitly target.
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4.2 Sanity check 2: power against a first-order Markov alternative
Here we evaluate the evidence measure (6) in the well-specified case where data come from a first-order
Markov process. Figure 4 illustrates that the asymptotics given by Theorem 7 kick in early, as evidenced
by the (log)-evidence growing linearly with the sample size.
(a) Markov(0.1, 0.9) (b) Markov(0.4, 0.6)
Figure 4: Blue: the evolution of lnRt, under a Markov process that is relatively far from Bernoulli (left)
and one that is closer (right). Red: the linear approximation with slope r∗ from Theorem 7.
4.3 Power against a time-varying Markov alternative
Recalling (9), one might conjecture that if a sequence has equal zeroth and first-order frequency limits,
then our test will be powerless. Here, we show that this is not necessarily the case. Namely, we show that
it is possible for a sequence to have frequency limits limt→∞ n1/t = limt→∞ n1|0/n0 = limt→∞ n1|1/n1
(this happens almost surely under a Bernoulli source) while (Rt) still diverges to infinity, meaning that we
reject the exchangeability null at any confidence level. We will consider a time-varying Markov source with
symmetric transition probabilities p0|0(t) = p1|1(t) = 1/2 + δt, for some decreasing sequence δt tending to
0. To make the example interesting, we need two properties of the “repetition bias” δt:
• We aim to pick δt small enough so that the above limit frequencies are 1/2. In particular, this
requires limt→∞
∑t
s=1 δs/t = 0. For example, δt := 1/t
α for α > 0 would do for this purpose.
• We aim to pick δt large enough so that lnRt → ∞. To this end, we can use the Law of the
Iterated Logarithm to conclude that after t rounds n0 and n1 are both t/2 ± O(
√
t ln ln t) while




t ln ln t). Let us write `(t) for the likelihood ratio of
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ln ln t term inside the square). To investigate the
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behaviour ever so slightly above this threshold, we ended up picking δt := F (t + 1) − F (t) for
F (t) := min{t/2,
√
t ln(1 + t)}, where the min ensures that δt ≤ 1/2 from t = 1 without affecting
the order of growth. The results are displayed and discussed in Figure 5.
(a) Markov(1/2−δt, 1/2+δt). This source is “sticky”,
in that it slightly favours repeating the previous
outcome. The evidence against the null diverges.
Red is the approximation (15) with the constant
in O(·) taken to be 1, while green is (15) with the
constant in O(·) as −1 and ln(t) subtracted.
(b) Bernoulli(1/2+ δt) = Markov(1/2+ δt, 1/2+ δt).
This source is one-sided, in that it slightly favours
ones. No evidence against the null accumulates.
The green line is the lower bound − ln(t) following
from (8).
Figure 5: The evolution of our evidence (lnRt) for a time-varying Markov process. On the left the transition
probabilities are p1|1(t) = p0|0(t) = 1/2 + δt for δt := F (t+ 1)− F (t) with F (t) := min{t/2,
√
t ln(1 + t)}.
On the right, we perform a sanity check with p1|1(t) = p1|0(t) = 1/2 + δt instead, which renders this a
time-varying Bernoulli process. As predicted, on the left the log-evidence diverges, growing at a logarithmic
rate (which is far slower than the linear rate of Figure 4). The right picture confirms that this is due to
the Markovian aspect of the source, and not due to the changing probabilities.
Despite the generality and pathwise nature of Theorem 7, this experiment points towards the possibility
of strengthening it even further. Indeed, Theorem 7 has a very natural sufficient condition for consistency,
but this experiment shows that even when this condition does not hold (meaning that the limits (9) exist
and the condition (10) fails), then our safe e-process can still be consistent in certain subtle settings. These
subtleties were apparent to us when designing this example, but we are not yet sure how to formalize
these observations in a general fashion, and thus leave this to future work.
Another such example that demonstrates the unexpected power of our approach is examined next.
4.4 Power against a change point alternative
We consider a somewhat counterintuitive example to show that a first-order Markov alternative to
exchangeability is perhaps more powerful than one may believe at first sight. Consider a length 2n
sequence of coin flips sampled from Ber(p)nBer(q)n for some p 6= q. To match the setup of this example
with our initial problem set up, one could potentially extend this to an infinite sequence in an arbitrary
way, for example just continuing as Ber(q) after time 2n.
This sequence is clearly not exchangeable. It is, however, not clear whether our proposed first-order
Markov alternative would detect (much) evidence against the null, as the sequence is not Markov, but
is more like a change point alternative. Detecting evidence is not a given; the outcomes are in fact
independent (albeit not identically distributed). Hence there is no first-order dependency structure for
the Markov model to exploit. And on top of that, there seems to be only one problematic time-point,
precisely half-way through the sequence. So even if the Markov model somehow exploited this, how could
it gain an amount of evidence growing with the length n of the sequence?
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Figure 6: The process (lnRt) on a sequence sampled from Ber(.1)5000Ber(.4)5000. On the first half, we
see (Rt) decays as 1/t, which is due to the overhead of Jeffreys’ mixture for the Markov model over the
maximum likelihood Bernoulli parameter. After the change point, we see (Rt) increasing fast on the
exponential scale. Recalling (4) for those more familiar with the p-value scale, the corresponding anytime
p-process dips below 10−20 towards the end.
We now show that the above arguments are all misguided, and that the process (Rt) from (6) gains an
amount of evidence against the exchangeable null that grows exponentially with t, between time n and 2n.
The evolution of (Rt) on a typical run of this process is shown in Figure 6.
Initially, (Rt) loses steam and tends towards zero at a rate 1/t before time n since the null is true and
there is a price to pay for the Jeffreys’ mixture over the alternative. To calibrate what to expect after the
change point, think of n as being relatively large so that we can reason about empirical frequencies of
zeros and ones with more ease. Let us compute the maximum likelihood parameters for typical sequences
with frequency (tending to) p in the first half and q in the second half. For the Bernoulli model, we find





(1− p)p+ (1− q)q
(1− p) + (1− q)
.
The main observation here is that the best Markov model is i.i.d. if p̂1|1 = p̂1|0 = p̂, which occurs if and
only if p = q. The fact that an exploitable first-order Markov dependency structure arises can perhaps
be best observed in the extreme case p = 0 and q = 1. As this comparison does not really depend on
n, we find that for all other parameter settings with p 6= q, the Markov model will gain overall evidence
exponentially growing with t between time n and 2n. (Technically, the exponential growth does not start
immediately at time n+ 1, but it does so eventually.) However, as t grows even further — say beyond
t = n2 or t = 2n — (Rt) will decrease once more towards zero. This is because the sequence eventually is
dominated by i.i.d. Ber(q) coin flips, and the MLE under the null explains the data very well.
Thus, for this example, we do not get a power one test, nor should we expect a single change point away
from an i.i.d. model to yield power one for a test designed to be powerful against Markovian alternatives.
However, if the initial pattern repeats itself after 2n steps, meaning that we keep alternating between
Ber(p) and Ber(q) models, then (Rt) does have power one, and this is interesting because (Rt) is designed
for first-order Markov alternatives, but it is consistent against these 2n-th order Markov alternatives.
In fact, one can argue that it is information theoretically impossible to design any power one test,
including tests that are tuned to detect a single change point. To see why, think of very small n, like
n = 2, to make the reason intuitively transparent. How can a test possibly have enough evidence with just
one or two coin flips before the change point, to know with probability one a change actually did occur?
Naturally, the larger the time n of the change point, the higher the power could be of any such test (as it
is for our test also), but no test can possibly have power one since there is always some small probability
(vanishing with n) that the distribution of the first n coin flips look quite similar to the post-change
distribution.
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Nevertheless, this simple example illustrates the point that our proposed e-process (Rt) for evidence
against exchangeability is actually powerful even in scenarios that are not (close to) Markov.
Deriving other e-processes targeted towards change point alternatives. For readers explicitly
interested in powerful tests to detect change point alternatives in the setting of this paper, we briefly
describe a powerful test (albeit not a power one test, as already explained above). Essentially, one can
combine the ideas in Remark 2.6 with those in Section 2.7. We let Pk denote the alternative in which the
change point is hypothesized to occur at time n = 2k, though other increasing functions of k may also
suffice. We will define an e-process (Ekt ) for each k and then use a countable mixture over k as the final
e-process.
Now, we describe an e-process for a fixed k. Define (g−s )ns=1 to be a smoothed non-anticipating
maximum likelihood estimator, calculated using data from time 1 to s− 1. The smoothing step is simple:
add a single fake observation worth half a heads (or half a tails) to the counts when determining the
MLE. The smoothing leads to a slight regularization that can be viewed as the maximum-a-posteriori
estimate using a Beta(1/2, 1/2) prior, analogous to Krichevsky-Trofimov betting [20]. Similarly, define
(g+s )
∞
s=n+1 to be the same smoothed non-anticipating maximum likelihood estimator, but calculated using
data from time n+ 1 to s− 1. In both cases, the smoothing also leads to a well-defined function g−1 and
g+n+1, which are effectively treated as a Ber(1/2) model. Finally, define the e-process (E
k









s (Xs) to the maximum likelihood under the i.i.d. null. In other words, the
denominator is identical to one of Rt, but the numerator has changed because the targeted alternative is
now different.
Recalling Section 2.7 (and the final section of Wasserman et al. [42]), it is easy to see that (Ekt ) is a





t will grow exponentially between time n∗ and 2n∗. Even with the countable weighting of Remark 2.6,
their exponential growth washes out the inverse polynomial weights, to yield a powerful e-process (Et).
Naturally, many permutations and combinations of these ideas (see e.g. the literature on switching
experts [18]) can be used to derive a variety of tests against different kinds of alternatives. See Section 5.3
and [37] for an approach based on conformal prediction. We leave further exploration of these variants to
future work.
4.5 Power on a real-world data set
We conclude the empirical evaluation with a jovial yet practical question: if we track the days on
which it rains in London, do we get an exchangeable sequence? Three of us having lived there deemed
this hypothesis unlikely yet not implausible, but a Markovian alternative certainly seems a-priori more
plausible. To answer our question, we obtained daily areal rainfall data for North London from https:
//data.london.gov.uk/dataset/daily-areal-rainfall, spanning the 4404 days between 01/01/2007
to 21/01/2019. We binarised the data by comparing the daily total millimeters to zero, resulting in 59%
rainy days overall. As is clear from Figure 7, the null hypothesis can be safely rejected.
4.6 An equivalent viewpoint based on confidence sequences
It is possible to view our sequential test — rejecting the null if (Rt) ever exceeds 1/α — in terms of
sequential estimation using confidence sequences [2, 13, 22]. Denoting Qp := Ber(p)∞, a (1−α)-confidence









To see that (Ct) is a confidence sequence for p, note that p /∈ Ct if and only if RJP,pt ≥ 1/α, but Ville’s
inequality yields that Qp(∃t ≥ 1 : RJP,pt ≥ 1/α) since R
JP,p
t is a Qp-NM.
Based on the above argument, Theorems 6 and 7 together imply the following:
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Figure 7: The process (lnRt) accumulating evidence against the hypothesis that daily rain in North
London is an exchangeable process.
• Rejecting the null as soon as (Ct) becomes empty is identical to rejecting if (Rt) ever exceeds 1/α:
inf{t ≥ 1 : Ct = ∅} = inf
{





This is because Rt = infq∈[0,1]R
JP,q
t , making the decision rules identical.
• If the data X1, X2, . . . are exchangeable, then with probability at least 1−α, Ct is always nonempty.
Indeed, it is possible to argue that Ct will shrink to a single point with probability ≥ 1− α. Indeed,
a single draw from Q ∈ Q is simply an i.i.d. Ber(p)∞ sequence for some p; and for any q 6= p, RJP,qs
will eventually exceed 1/α because Jeffrey’s mixture likelihood (a mixture over all first-order Markov
chains, including the special case that recovers an i.i.d. Ber(p) sequence) will explain the data much
better than the Ber(q) likelihood. This can be formalized via the regret bound (8) but this simple
argument is omitted for brevity.
• Since Ct contains the aforementioned p under the null (simultaneously for all t with probability at








is also nonempty with probability
at least 1 − α. This means that the decision rule inf{t ≥ 1 :
⋂
s≤t Cs = ∅} yields a valid level α
sequential test that could potentially halt sooner than (16). (The advantage is only expected to be
slight in practice.)
• For any sequence of observations where the limits in (9) exist but (10) fails to hold, Ct will become
empty at some point (deterministically). As explained around Theorem 7, the aforementioned failure
of (10) happens with probability one under first-order Markovian alternatives, for example.
Figure 8 illustrates these points using the running intersection
⋂
s≤t Cs on synthetic and real-world data.
4.7 Calibrated p-processes and adjusted e-processes for not losing capital
While (Rt) is a Q-safe e-process, (maxs≤tRs) is not. In other words, we are only allowed to measure our
performance based on the wealth accumulated thus far and not the highest wealth that we reached at
some point in the process. The same is not true for p-processes: (1/Rt) is a Q-valid p-process, and so is
(1/maxs≤tRs), the latter being the running infimum of the former. In game-theoretic terminology, the
gambler can decide to stop playing the game (betting against the null) according to any stopping rule
τ , but once they have stopped, only the final wealth Rτ of the gambler matters, and a nearly bankrupt
gambler cannot point to their past wealth as a measure of their proficiency. This subtle point particularly
manifests itself in the above change point example, because with a single change point, (Rt) rises to some
amount (above 1020 in the figure) and then will shrink back to zero, so if we happen to stop too late, then
Rτ could provide only meagre evidence even though it was once astronomically large.
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(a) The rain dataset from Section 4.5. At all α consid-
ered, the confidence interval becomes empty, meaning
that we reject the null.
(b) Ber(0.2) (as in Section 4.1). Here the null is true,
and indeed all confidence intervals stay non-empty.
Figure 8: The confidence sequence (anytime-valid confidence interval)
⋂
s≤t Cs for p is depicted by its
lower and upper boundaries as a function of t, at various coverage probabilities α ∈ (0, 1). The running
average of the data is displayed in black. As predicted, the confidence sequence becomes empty when the
null is false (left), while it stays non-empty when the null is true (right).
So how can we get around this worrisome issue? We take inspiration from Shafer et al. [31] and use
“calibrated p-processes” as our e-processes. (As a matter of terminology, our use of calibration here can
be seen as an E → P → E process, but if we skip the middle step entirely, the E → E direct method
has been called “adjustment” by Dawid et al. [4, 3], Koolen and Vovk [19]. We will present it from both
angles below to tie some loose ends in the literature together.)
Define pt := 1/maxs≤tRs, so that (pt) is a Q-valid p-process that satisfies (4). Let f be a calibrator [31,
22], which is a nonincreasing function f such that
∫ 1
0
f(u)du = 1. Then (f(pt)) is a Q-safe e-process. It is
not hard to check that f(pt) ≤ Rt, so there is some price to pay for being able to take the best possible
wealth into account. One possible choice for f is given by
f(u) :=
1− u+ u lnu
u(− lnu)2
;
also see Vovk and Wang [36, Eq. (2)].




F (y)y−2dy = 1. Defining At := F (maxs≤tRs) yields that (At) is a Q-safe e-process, and
indeed as before At ≤ Rt. One possible choice for F is given by
F (y) :=
y2 ln 2
(1 + y)(ln(1 + y))2
.
Thus, even if (Rt) rises sharply and then decreases to zero eventually, (At) does not since it is nondecreasing.
In fact, using the F given above in our example with a single change point, and noting that F (y)  y/(ln y)2
for large y, we see that A∞ ≈ 1017 even though R∞ = 0. Of course, if Rt → ∞ then so does F (Rt),
meaning that it does not lose the consistency property against Markovian alternatives.
Thus, at a (squared) logarithmic price to the overall capital, one can be protected against future losses,
and for this reason we recommend using At = F (Rt) as an e-process if we are uncertain about how close
our alternative might be to the idealized Markovian case studied here.
5 Summary and discussion
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5.1 From convex hulls to fork-convex hulls
The celebrated theorem of de Finetti — for which many proofs exist including based on elementary
arguments [17] — states that all exchangeable binary sequences are mixtures of i.i.d. sequences (this was
generalized much beyond the binary setting by Hewitt and Savage [11]). In fact, for any exchangeable
sequence, the empirical measure Pt := (1/t)
∑t
s=1 δXs converges in distribution to a measure µ supported
on [0, 1], and this is the so-called “de Finetti mixing measure” alluded to in the previous sentence. The
crux of the matter is that the convex hull of all i.i.d. distributions over infinite binary sequences is precisely
the set of exchangeable distributions. Since the convex hull preserves properties like safety (of e-processes)
and validity (of sequential tests and p-processes), one can develop tests for the i.i.d. setting, which is itself
a nontrivial composite null, and invoke de Finetti’s theorem to extend the result to the exchangeable
setting.
In this paper, we go several steps further: we prove that the set of Markovian sequences lies inside
the “fork-convex hull” of all exchangeable (or i.i.d.) sequences. In fact, Theorem 17 shows that the closed
fork-convex hull is so large that every law over binary sequences is contained in it!
The fork-convex hull of a set of distributions can be informally thought of as a “predictable mixture
of these distributions” (here, we borrow the terminology of predictable mixtures from Waudby-Smith
and Ramdas [43], where it was applied to processes). Speaking informally in language inspired from
game-theoretic probability, if Reality wanted to draw an infinite sequence from the fork-convex hull of Q,
it would pick Q1 and draw (only) X1 from it, then based on that the outcome, Reality would pick Q2 and
draw (only) X2 from its conditional distribution given X1, and so forth ad infinitum, each time using the
observed data to pick the next (conditional) distribution as it wishes.
Fork-convexity was a central object in this paper, and one of its primary roles was in dealing a fatal
blow to tests based on constructing nonnegative supermartingales, as summarized next.
5.2 The powerlessness of test supermartingales, and a powerful e-process
Theorem 13 shows that the nonnegative supermartingale (NSM) property is preserved not just by taking
the convex hull of a set of distributions, but also when taking the (much larger) fork-convex hull. Using
composite Snell envelopes, Corollary 16 shows that if a safe test for Q is upper bounded by a Q-NSM, then
it must have already been safe for the fork-convex hull of Q (and thus powerless). Together, these results
show that any NSM under exchangeable distributions is also an NSM under Markovian distributions,
and in fact it is an NSM under every distribution over binary sequences. In other words, test statistics
that are NSMs (or “test supermartingales”) are nonincreasing sequences, rendering them powerless to
distinguish non-exchangeable distributions from exchangeable ones.
We get around the above hurdles by designing a safe e-process (Rt) in (6) that is upper bounded
by some nonnegative martingale for every exchangeable distribution, despite not being an NSM itself.
(The idea of designing a process that is upper bounded by an NSM, despite not being one itself, also
appears elsewhere in the sequential testing literature [12], but for different reasons.) Our safe e-process
uses the method of mixtures with Jeffreys’ prior to handle the composite alternative, along with the
maximum likelihood under the null, to ultimately yield a computationally efficient closed-form e-process.
This e-process not only has the desired safety properties at arbitrary stopping times (Theorem 6), but we
prove that it has power one against any first-order Markovian alternative, and also a generic dense set of
higher-order Markovian alternatives (Theorem 7). For first-order alternatives, the e-process also grows at
an optimal rate, as implied by a regret bound (8) borrowed from the universal coding literature.
Section 2 also describes how to derive other e-processes that work for higher-order Markovian alterna-
tives, and finally also for even more general, loosely specified alternatives by combining the method of
predictable mixtures [43] and betting [28], along with universal inference [42].
5.3 Vovk’s approach based on conformal prediction
An alternate approach towards testing exchangeability was recently expounded by Vovk [35], which is
based on conformal prediction. It replaces the canonical filtration (Ft) by a poorer filtration (Gt) formed
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by conformal p-values. (We refer to their paper for the technical details.) Vovk then produces a sequence
of independent p-variables under the null, which are converted to e-processes by appropriate calibration,
which are in turn combined to form a martingale with respect to (Gt). This is particularly interesting
because, despite the only martingales with respect to (Ft) being constants, Vovk is able to identify
nontrivial martingales with respect to an appropriately impoverished filtration (Gt).
Our approaches based on Jeffreys’ mixture and the nonanticipating likelihood (or predictable mixture)
can be seen as providing two alternatives to Vovk’s methodology. Vovk’s algorithm seems particularly
powerful for change point alternatives, making them most similar to the extensions discussed in Section 4.4,
while our paper focuses more on Markov alternatives. Further, since Vovk’s martingale property only
holds with respect to (Gt), so are the set of stopping times for which his method has the safety property.
In other words, the algorithm is not allowed to look at the raw data and decide when to stop; it must
only look at the sequence of p-variables. In contrast, our method is safe with respect to a much larger
class of stopping times, indeed all possible stopping times (with respect to (Ft), the canonical filtration).
However, in the end, the details of both works appear to be very different, and the conceptual principles
by which the methods are derived also differ significantly.
A final, alternate approach to this problem could utilize reverse martingales and exchangeable filtrations.
To elaborate, the exchangeable filtration is the reverse filtration (Et)∞t=0 where E0 := σ({X1, X2, . . . }),
and for all t ≥ 1, Et denotes the σ-algebra generated by all real-valued Borel-measurable functions
f(X1, X2, . . . ) which are permutation-symmetric in their first t arguments, so that E0 ⊇ E1 ⊇ E2 . . .. It
is known that if the data are exchangeable, then the empirical measure Pt := (1/t)
∑t
s=1 δXs forms a
measure-valued reverse martingale with respect to the exchangeable filtration, in the sense that (
∫
gdPt),
is a reverse martingale for any bounded and Borel-measurable function g [15]. In fact, the converse of
this statement also holds true if the sequence (Xt) is stationary [1]. This fact has recently been exploited
to develop confidence sequences and sequential tests in other contexts [21]. We hope to explore in more
detail whether this approach can lead to powerful tests for exchangeability in the future.
5.4 A game-theoretic protocol and reinterpretation of Theorem 7
Despite our work being grounded in measure theory, it has some implications for game theoretic probability,
as developed by Shafer and Vovk, amongst others. Due to lack of space, we presume the reader has some
general familiarity with their setup and refer to their latest book [30] for details. We recall from Shafer
[28] the basic protocol of testing by betting:
A skeptic begins with initial wealth of one, K0 := 1.
for t = 1, 2, . . .
— A forecaster announces a distribution Qt for Xt.
— A skeptic announces a bet St : {0, 1} → R+ such that EQt [St(Xt)] ≤ 1.
— Reality announces the outcome xt.
— The skeptic’s wealth gets updated as Kt := Kt−1 · St(xt).
At any point in time, the skeptic’s wealth Kt acts as a measure of evidence against the forecaster. Instead
of announcing a single distribution Qt, the forecaster could announce a set of distributions Qt, in which
case the bet St must satisfy the constraint that supQt∈Qt EQt [St(Xt)] ≤ 1. While this protocol is very
general, the setup for the current paper is better understood using the following protocol.
A forecaster F announces a set of distributions Q for the entire sequence.
A skeptic S wishes to challenge F, and observes that Q = conv(
⋃
m∈MQm), for some setM,
where Qm is itself a set of distributions.
S requests F to play a different game for each m ∈M, starting each with one dollar, Km0 := 1.
F accepts the request, as long as the Skeptic’s net wealth is measured by its worst performance
across all games, that is, Kt := infm∈MKmt .
for t = 1, 2, . . .
—For eachm ∈M, Skeptic places a bet Smt : {0, 1} → R+ such that supQmt ∈Qmt EQmt [S
m
t (Xt)] ≤ 1,
where Qmt (Xt) := Qm(Xt|Xt−1) for each Qm ∈ Qm and Qmt := {Qmt : Qm ∈ Qm}.
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— Reality announces the (common across games) outcome xt.
— The skeptic’s wealth in the m-th game gets updated as Kmt := Kmt−1 · Smt (xt).
In this paper, of course, M := [0, 1], m := p, and Qm := {Ber(p)∞} is a singleton. The skeptic’s
wealth Kt := infm∈MKmt would be the game-theoretic instantiation of an e-process (while in the earlier
setup, it would have been a supermartingale). Even though we do not employ the added generality, it is
worth noting that both the above protocols are just special cases of the following protocol that affords the
forecaster more flexibility.
S and F agree to play a set of games indexed by m ∈ M, starting each with one dollar,
Km0 := 1. The Skeptic’s net wealth is measured by Kt := infm∈MKmt .
for t = 1, 2, . . .
— For each m ∈M, Forecaster announces a set of distributions Qmt on Xt.
— For eachm ∈M, Skeptic places a bet Smt : Xt → R+ such that supQmt ∈Qmt EQmt [S
m
t (Xt)] ≤ 1.
— Reality announces the (common across games) outcome xt ∈ Xt.
— The skeptic’s wealth in the m-th game gets updated as Kmt := Kmt−1 · Smt (xt).
The reader may also refer to Chapter 10 of Shafer and Vovk [30] for related ideas that are presented
somewhat differently there.
We now reinterpret our main theorem in a game-theoretic language, inspired by the original results of
Ville’s PhD thesis [34], which gave a gambling interpretation to measure-zero sets. In particular, Ville
proved that for any event of measure zero (say, under Ber(1/2)∞), one can design a betting strategy (a
nonnegative martingale) whose wealth increases to infinity whenever that event occurs; see Proposition 8.14
in Shafer and Vovk [29]. Inspired by this result, and the fact that Theorem 7 is a pathwise statement that
holds true for every path, we can restate it in the spirit of Ville’s work. To this end, define the set
A := {ω ∈ {0, 1}∞ : either the limits in (9) do not exist, or they exist and condition (10) holds}.
Note that the set A satisfies infQ∈Q Q(A) = 1, meaning that for an exchangeable sequence, the aforemen-
tioned limits (almost) always hold and the corresponding condition is (almost) always satisfied. In other
words, its complement satisfies supQ∈Q Q(A
c) = 0. Then, Theorem 7 states that our process (Rt) increases
to infinity whenever Ac occurs. The safety property of (Rt) corresponds to it being a valid betting strategy
under the second (and third) game-theoretic protocol presented above. Thus, informally, (Rt) could be
seen as an explicitly constructed “witness” to Ville’s theorem in the above context.
Deriving a fully general, ‘robust’ version of Ville’s theorem that holds for composite nulls Q (and yet
recovers Ville’s original theorem for singleton nulls) appears to be an important open direction.
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A Additional technical concepts and definitions
A.1 Reference measures and local absolute continuity
Consider a probability space with a filtration (Ft)t∈N0 . Let R be a particular probability measure on F∞;
we think of R as a reference measure. We now explain the concept of local domination and how it allows
us to unambiguously define conditional expectations.
• If P is a probability measure on F∞ and τ is a stopping time, we write P|τ for the restriction of P to
Fτ . (This is simply the probability measure on Fτ defined by P|τ (A) = P(A), A ∈ Fτ . Think of this
as the ‘coarsening’ of P that only operates on events observable up to time τ .)
• P is called locally dominated by R (or locally absolutely continuous with respect to R), if P|t  R|t for
all t ∈ N. We write this Ploc R. More explicitly, this means that
R(A) = 0 ⇒ P(A) = 0, for any A ∈ Ft and t ∈ N.
Local absolute continuity does not imply that P  R. However, it does imply that P|τ  R|τ
for any finite (but possibly unbounded) stopping time τ . Indeed, if A ∈ Fτ and R(A) = 0, then
A ∩ {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for all t, and hence P(A) = limt→∞ P(A ∩ {τ ≤ t}) = 0.
• A set P of probability measures on F∞ is called locally dominated by R if every element of P is
locally dominated by R.
• Any Ploc R has an associated likelihood ratio process (often also called density process), namely
the R-martingale (Zt) given by Zt := dP|t/dR|t. Being a nonnegative martingale, once Zt reaches
zero it stays there. Thus with the convention 0/0 := 1, the ratios Zτ/Zt are well-defined for any
t ∈ N and any finite stopping time τ ≥ t. Note that each Zt is defined up to R-nullsets, and therefore
also up to P-nullsets.
• If Ploc R has likelihood ratio process (Zt), the following ‘Bayes formula’ holds: for any t ∈ N, any
finite stopping times τ , and any nonnegative Fτ -measurable random variable Y , one has






The right-hand side is uniquely defined R-almost surely (not just P-almost surely), and therefore
provides a ‘canonical’ version of EP[Y | Ft]. We always use this version. This allows us to view such
conditional expectations under P as being well-defined up to R-nullsets.
One might ask why we work with local domination, rather a ‘global’ condition like P  R for all P
of interest. The answer is that such a condition would be far too restrictive, as we now illustrate. Let
(Xt)t∈N be a sequence of random variables. For each η ∈ R, let Pη be the distribution such that the Xt
become i.i.d. normal with mean η and unit variance. By the strong law of large numbers, Pη assigns
probability one to the event Aη := {limt→∞ t−1
∑t
s=1Xs = η}. Moreover, the events Aη are mutually
disjoint: Aη ∩Aν = ∅ whenever η 6= ν. This means by definition that the measures Pµ are all mutually
singular. Since there is an uncountable number of them, there cannot exist a measure R such that Pη  R
for all η. On the other hand, if Pη|t denotes the law of the partial sequence X1, . . . , Xt for some t ∈ N, then
the measures Pη|t, η ∈ R, are all mutually absolutely continuous. In particular, we could (for instance)
use R = P0 as reference measure and obtain Pη loc R for all η ∈ R.
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A.2 Essential supremum
On some probability space, consider a collection (Yα)α∈A of random variables, where A is an arbitrary
index set. If A is uncountable, the pointwise supremum supα∈A Yα might not be measurable (not a random
variable). Moreover, it might happen that Yα = 0 almost surely for every α ∈ A, but supα∈A Yα = 1. For
these reasons, the pointwise supremum is often not useful. Instead, one can use the essential supremum.
Proposition 19. There exists a [−∞,∞]-valued random variable Y , called the essential supremum and
denoted by ess supα∈A Yα, such that
1. Y ≥ Yα, almost surely, for every α ∈ A,
2. if Y ′ is a random variable that satisfies Y ′ ≥ Yα, almost surely, for every α ∈ A, then Y ′ ≥ Y ,
almost surely.
The essential supremum is almost surely unique.
In words, the essential supremum is the smallest almost sure upper bound on (Yα). The proposition
guarantees that it always exists. In some cases, more can be said: the essential supremum can be obtained
as the limit of an increasing sequence.
Proposition 20. Suppose (Yα) is closed under maxima, meaning that for any α, β ∈ A there is some
γ ∈ A such that Yγ = max{Yα, Yβ}. Then there is a sequence (αn) such that (Yαn) is an increasing
sequence and ess supα∈A Yα = limn→∞ Yαn .
For more information about the essential supremum (and infimum), as well as proofs of the above
results, we refer to Section A.5 in [9].
B Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 4. It is clear that (ii) implies (i). Now assume that (i) holds, for the moment with
k = 1. Let M denote the transition matrix of the Markov process (Xt), i.e., the matrix with elements pj|i
for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Note that exchangeability yields
P(X3 = j|X2 = i) = P(X3 = j|X1 = i)
for i, j ∈ {0, 1}, hence M2 = M . If M has full rank then M is the identity matrix and (Xt) is constant in
time. If M does not have full rank then its two rows are the same since its row sums are always equal to
one. It follows that X1, X2, . . . are independent. Moreover, by exchangeability X1, X2, X3, . . . have the
same distribution. Thus (Xt) is i.i.d. This shows the statement for k = 1.
Let us assume that (i) holds for a general k ∈ N. Instead of providing a modification of the above
argument now with transition tensors, let us give an alternative probabilistic, more verbose argument.
For simplicity, we only focus on the case k = 2; it is clear how to generalize this argument. Note that
the Markov property yields that the law of X5 conditional on (X1, X2, X3, X4) equals the law of X5
conditional on (X3, X4). By exchangeability, this also equals the law of X5 conditional on (X1, X2).
This again yields that either (Xt) is constant or the law of X5 does not depend on the earlier values
(X1, X2, X3, X4). This observation concludes the proof.
Remark 21. In this remark, let us briefly discuss Proposition 4 in the context of a general Markov
process (Yt), say with a countable state space. This is not required below but sheds additional light on
Proposition 4(ii). To this end, let us hence assume that (Yt) is an exchangeable Markov process with
countable state space. First of all, note that exchangeability yields that (Yt) reaches state i from state j if
and only if it reaches state j from state i. Indeed, for s, t ∈ N we have P(Ys = i, Yt = j) = P(Ys = j, Yt = i).
Hence, the state space can be partitioned in subsets, say with index set I, such that in each of these subsets,
each state ‘communicates’ with any other. A suitable modification of the proof of Proposition 4 now shows
that (Yt) can be constructed as follows. First draw an I-valued random variable to choose the subset of the
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state space in which (Yt) will take values, and then choose i.i.d. draws of a distribution whose support is
exactly this subset. As a corollary, conditionally on Y1, the random variables Y2, Y3, . . . are i.i.d. Indeed, it
is easy to see that a {0, 1}-valued process (Xt) that satisfies Proposition 4(ii) also satisfies that X2, X3, . . .
are i.i.d. conditional on X1.
Proof of Theorem 14. The proof is essentially a simplified version of an argument due to Delbaen [6,
Theorem 11]. This result is argued in continuous time and on a bounded time interval. For the convenience
of the reader, we provide a self-contained proof for this paper’s discrete-time, infinite-horizon setup.
For each fixed s ∈ N, Ls is defined as the essential supremum of the family consisting of all EQ[Eτ | Fs],
indexed by all pairs (Q, τ) with Q ∈ Q and τ ≥ s a finite stopping time. Here we use a version of the
conditional expectation that satisfies EQ[Eτ | Fs] = 0 on the event {Zs = 0}, where (Zt) denotes the
likelihood ratio process of Q (see Appendix A). We claim that this family of conditional expectations is closed
under maxima. To prove this claim, let (Q, τ) and (Q′, τ ′) be given. Let A := {EQ[Eτ | Fs] ≥ EQ′ [Eτ ′ | Fs]}
and set




Zt, t ≤ s1AZt + 1AcZs Z ′t
Z ′s
, t > s
where (Zt) and (Z ′t) are the likelihood ratio processes of Q and Q′, respectively. Note that Z ′s > 0 on Ac so
that Z ′′t is well-defined. Since A belongs to Fs and τ, τ ′ ≥ s, τ ′′ is a (finite) stopping time. Moreover,
since Q is fork-convex, (Z ′′t ) is the likelihood ratio process of some Q′′ ∈ Q. We now compute













∣∣∣∣Fs]+ ER [ Z ′τ ′Z ′s 1AcEτ ′
∣∣∣∣Fs]
= 1AEQ [Eτ | Fs] + 1AcEQ′ [Eτ ′ | Fs]
= max {EQ [Eτ | Fs] , EQ′ [Eτ ′ | Fs]} .
This demonstrates closure under maxima.
Now fix any Q ∈ Q and s ∈ N. Thanks to the closure property under maxima, Proposition 20 shows that
there exist families (Qn) of measures in Q and (τn) of finite stopping times taking values in {s, s+ 1, . . .}
such that EQn [Eτn | Fs] ↑ Ls almost surely under R, and hence under Q. Therefore, by the conditional
version of the monotone convergence theorem,




EQn [Eτn | Fs]
∣∣∣Fs−1] = lim
n→∞
EQ[EQn [Eτn | Fs] | Fs−1]. (17)
Replacing Qn by (1 − n−1)Qn + n−1Q we still have (17) and, in addition, Q absolutely continuous with
respect to Qn. From now on we use this modified choice of Qn. Let (Zt) and (Znt ) be the likelihood ratio
processes of Q and Qn, respectively, and define
Z̃nt :=
Zt, t ≤ s,ZsZnt
Zns
, t > s.
33
By fork-convexity, (Z̃nt ) is the likelihood ratio process of some Q̃n ∈ Q. We then get

























= EQ̃n [Eτn | Fs−1]
≤ Ls−1.
Combining this with (17) gives EQ[Ls | Fs−1] ≤ Ls−1. Iterating this inequality and using that F0 is
trivial yields EQ[Ls] ≤ L0. In particular, Ls is Q-integrable. Since (Et) is a Q-safe e-process, we have
L0 = supQ∈Q, τ≥0 EQ[Eτ ] ≤ 1. Since Q ∈ Q and s ∈ N were arbitrary, this proves that (Lt) is a Q-NSM
with L0 ≤ 1.
Let (L′t) be another Q-NSM that dominates (Et). Then for any Q ∈ Q, any t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, and any
finite stopping time τ ≥ t, the optional stopping theorem under Q gives L′t ≥ EQ[L′τ | Ft] ≥ EQ[Eτ | Ft].
Therefore L′t ≥ Lt by the definition of essential supremum.
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